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Délton Winter de Carvalho

THE ORE TAILINGS DAM RUPTURE DISASTER
IN MARIANA, BRAZIL 2015:

WHAT WE HAVE TO LEARN FROM
ANTHROPOGENIC DISASTERS
ABSTRACT:

This article presents a description of the largest environmental
disaster in Brazil to date, the rupture of the ore tailings dam which
occurred in the municipality of Mariana, Brazil. This event of
environmentally, economically and socially catastrophic
proportions was caused by a tsunami of mud from tailings
resulting from ore exploitation. This article preliminarily
describes the magnitude of the event, focusing on regulatory
failures that can yield lessons in order for future similar events to
be avoided. The ultimate goal of this article is to reflect on the low
capacity for evaluation and management of catastrophic risks, not
only in Brazil, but throughout the world. To this end, this article
will discuss how Disaster Law theory can provide a conceptual
tool used to identify the regulatory and preventative deficits which
compound the impact of serious environmental risks. This article
then discusses suitable ways to utilize disaster law theory in the
preparation of future disaster risk reduction policies.
INTRODUCTION
This article initially presents a reflection on the biggest environmental
disaster in Brazil in 2015: the rupture of the tailings dam of the Samarco Mining
Company in Mariana, in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais. Following this, the
article presents a reflection on what can be learned from anthropogenic disasters,
commonly named industrial accidents, with the purpose of avoiding future
occurrences. The focus presented here incorporates theory from the legal field of
Disaster Law. This article begins by making use of preliminary technical documents
from the dam rupture prepared by official environmental agencies, as well as material
and statements from those involved in the media coverage of this catastrophic event.
It should be noted, that this article, far from claiming to be a complete and
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comprehensive description of the entirety of damage to the dam and its
environmental, legal, political, and economic repercussions, aims instead to
demonstrate the low degree of legal sensitivity to environmental risks in Brazil and,
further, to explore how the mechanisms in place prior to this disaster in Brazil are
entirely too common not just within Brazil, but throughout the world. The failure to
pay greater attention to scientific information and the circularity in risk management
contributes to the severity of environmental disasters. This article explores how by
disaster law theory might be incorporated into new governmental mechanisms to
mitigate future contribution to environmental disasters
1. ORIGIN AND HIGHLIGHTS OF THE MARIANA DISASTER AND ITS
AFTERMATH
The Mariana disaster is considered the biggest environmental disaster in
Brazil’s history.1 The Marina disaster had its beginning on November 5, 2015, and
the impacts seem far from having an end. The rupture of the Fundão iron ore tailings
dam, belonging to the Samarco mining company, controlled by Vale do Rio Doce
and BHP Billiton, took place in the Bento Rodrigues sub-district of Mariana, in the
State of Minas Gerais, Brazil, causing a flood of ore tailings. After invading the Doce
River, the so-called “mud tsunami”2 passed through cities of two Brazilian states,
Minas Gerais and Espirito Santo, reaching the Atlantic Ocean sixteen days later.
The Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais
Renováveis - IBAMA3 Preliminary Technical Report of November 26, 2015
(“IBAMA Report”) on the event states:
“On 05.11.2015, the Fundão dam burst, belonging to the Germano
mining complex, in the municipality of Mariana / MG. The dam
contained 50 million m³ of iron mining tailings. It is a waste
classified as non-hazardous and not inert to iron and manganese
according to [Brazilian Norm] NBR 10.004. Thirty-four million
cubic meters of these wastes were released into the environment,

1. Dom Phillips. Samarco Dam Collapse: One Year on from Brazil`s Worst Environmental
Disaster, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2016, 3:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/2016/oct/15/samarco-dam-collapse-brazil-worst-environmental-disaster-bhp-billiton-valemining; Marina Branco and Fabio Ponso, Maior Desastre Ambiental do Brasil, Deixou 19 Mortos, O
GLOBO (Aug. 8, 2017, 1:00 PM), http://acervo.oglobo.globo.com/em-destaque/maior-desastre-ambientaldo-brasil-tragedia-de-mariana-deixou-19-mortos-20208009 (Braz.).
2. For reference to “mud tsumami/ tsunami de lama tóxica” see Heriberto Araujo, Tsunami de Lama
Tóxica, o Maior Desastre Ambiental do Brasil, EL PAÍS (Dec. 31, 2015), https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil
/2015/12/30/politica/1451479172_309602.html (Braz.).
3. IBAMA is the executive body responsible for implementing the National Environmental Policy
in Brazil, established by Law No. 6.938, of August 31, 1981, and carries out various activities for the
preservation and conservation of natural heritage, exercising control and oversight over the use of natural
resources (water, flora, fauna, soil, etc.). It is also responsible for granting environmental licenses to
undertakings within its competence. It could be said that it is the federal environmental agency in Brazil
and is part of the Brazilian Ministry of Environment.
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and further 16 million are gradually being carried downstream to
the sea, already in Espirito Santo State. ( . . . ). “4
Subsequently, in a synergistic effect, the Santarém dam broke, releasing
another 7 million m³ of tailings. Cumulatively, the accidents released a total of 62
million m³ of tailings.5
Also according to the IBAMA Report, about 663.2 km of water bodies were
directly impacted.6 The accident resulted in the deaths of 19 people in the district of
Bento Rodrigues.7 The accident also destroyed and damaged the water supply in
several municipalities and continues to cause serious environmental impacts from
the Doce River to the Atlantic Ocean, where the river ends.8
Due to the immense magnitude of the event, there is significant limitation
and great difficulty to describe in a sufficiently comprehensive way all of the
complexity and interconnection of the environmental and human impacts resulting
from the dam’s rupture. In fact, the number of affected people and ecosystems alone
demonstrate the magnitude of negative effects as well as the huge diversity in the
typology of these impacts. These immense and ongoing damages have come to be
known as a slow-motion disaster.9 This slow-moving disaster has caused direct,
serious, and onerous environmental and social damages. Territorially, it continues to
impact an entire region, affecting 663.2 km of water bodies in the states of Minas

4. IBAMA/DIPRO/CGEMA,

LAUDO

TÉCNICO

PRELIMINAR:

IMPACTOS

AMBIENTAIS

FUNDÃO, EM MARIANA,
MINAS GERAIS 1, 3 (2015), https://www.ibama.gov.br/phocadownload/barragemdefundao/laudos/laudo_
tecnico_preliminar_Ibama.pdf. (translated from original Portuguese to English by author) (Braz.)
[hereinafter IBAMA Report].
5. Valdo Cruz, Volume Vazado em Mariana Equivale a 1/3 da Capacidade da Guarapiranga, G1,
BLOG DO VALDO CRUZ (June 11, 2015, 8:05 PM), http://g1.globo.com/minas-gerais/noticia/2015/
11/volume-vazado-em-mariana-equivale-13-da-capacidade-da-guarapiranga.html (Braz.). It is now clear
that while the initial amount of tailings was cited to be several different amounts, the total amount of
tailings released was 62 million m3 of tailings. See Ana Lucia Azevedo, Acidente em Mariana é Maior da
História Com Barragens de Rejeitos, O GLOBO (Nov. 17, 2015, 2:22 PM), http://oglobo.globo.com/
brasil/acidente-em-mariana-o-maior-da-historia-com-barragens-de-rejeitos-18067899.
6. IBAMA Report, supra note 4.
7. Há 3 Anos, Rompimento de Barragem de Mariana Causou Maior Desastre Ambiental do País e
Matou 19 Pessoas, G1 (Jan. 25, 2019, 2:28 PM), https://g1.globo.com/mg/minas-gerais/noticia/2019
/01/25/ha-3-anos-rompimento-de-barragem-de-mariana-causou-maior-desastre-ambiental-do-pais-ematou-19-pessoas.ghtml (Braz.).
8. HeloÍsa Mendonça, Diretores da Samarco Serão Indiciados por Mortes na Tragédia de Mariana,
EL PAÍs (Feb. 5, 2016) (Braz.); see also Vanessa Hatje et al., Envtl. Impacts of One of the Largest Tailing
Dam Failures Worldwide, 7 SCI. REP. 10706 (2017), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-01711143-x.
9. In this regard, IBAMA’s preliminary technical report [Laudo Técnico Preliminar do IBAMA]
states that “the cause of the damage has not ceased, because the disaster is ongoing and there is still mud
leaking from the dam that broke in the municipality of Mariana, traversing the entire affected system.
Thus, as long as there is no stabilization, it will not be possible to measure the total damage and
impairments to the ichthyofauna.” IBAMA Report, supra note 4, at 16; see also Bruce Douglas, Brazil’s
Slow-Motion Catastrophe Unfolds, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2015, 2:03 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/business/2015/nov/13/brazils-slow-motion-environmental-catastrophe-unfolds (Braz.) (discussing how
this event was a slow moving disaster); Michael Faure, Introduction to DANIEL FARBER, DISASTER LAW
xiv (Daniel Farber & Michael G. Faure, eds., 2010) (General discussion on concept of slow-motion
disasters).
DECORRENTES DO DESASTRE ENVOLVENDO O ROMPIMENTO DA BARRAGEM DE
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Gerais and Espírito Santo. Impacts were also diagnosed in the estuary of the Doce
River and its coastal region.10
Released weeks after the event, the IBAMA report contained a preliminary
evaluation of the disaster’s enormity. The report noted the death and disappearance
of people; that populations had been displaced as a result of the destruction of public
and private structures (buildings, bridges, streets, etc.); localities were devastated,
with the consequent disintegration of community social ties; destruction of
agricultural areas and pastures, resulting in economic losses; interruption of
electricity generation by affected hydroelectric plants (Candonga, Aimorés and
Mascarenhas); destruction of permanent preservation areas and native vegetation of
the Atlantic Forest; mortality of aquatic biodiversity and terrestrial fauna; silting of
watercourses; disruption of water supply; interruption of fishing which still to this
day is for an indefinite period; disruption of tourism; loss and fragmentation of
habitats; restriction or weakening of ecosystem services; changes in the quality
standards of fresh, brackish and sea waters; feelings of fear and helplessness in the
population.11
To breakdown the damaging consequences, this Article now will examine
separately the direct human impacts, the environmental impacts, and the other
damages as analyzed in the IBAMA Report and the Minas Gerais Government’s
“Report on the Evaluation of Effects and Consequences of the Fundão Dam
Breakdown in Mariana-MG.” (“Minas Report”).
1.1. Direct and Indirect Human Impacts
The Minas Report published after the disaster exclusively focused on the
impact to that state. According to the report, there were a total of 10,482 people
affected by the disaster.12 The event further had drastic direct impacts on the
community and region, with negative effects on public health and fundamental safety
conditions of people on a microregional scale.13 In sum, the direct and indirect human
impacts included the impact to public health and fundamental safety conditions of
people, impact on the symbolic elements, impact on the access to education, and the

10. Brazil Dam Toxic Mud Reaches Atlantic via Rio Doce Estuary, BBC (Nov. 22, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-34892237.
11. IBAMA Report, supra note 4, at 4-5, 33-34; see also Viviane Machado e Mário Bonella, Três
Anos Depois, Situação do Rio Doce é Incerta e Samarco Tem Previsão de Volta só em 2020, G1 (May
11, 2018, 8:03 AM), https://g1.globo.com/es/espirito-santo/noticia/2018/11/05/tres-anos-depois-situacao
-do-rio-doce-e-incerta-e-samarco-tem-previsao-de-volta-so-em-2020.ghtml (Braz.).
12. BELO HORIZONTE: TASK FORCE GROUP, RELATÓRIO: AVALIAÇÃO DOS EFEITOS E
DESDOBRAMENTOS DO ROMPIMENTO DA BARRAGEM DE FUNDÃO EM MARIANA-MG, Decreto n.
46.892/2015, 1, 62 (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.agenciaminas.mg.gov.br/ckeditor_assets/attachments/770/
relatorio_final_ft_03_02_2016_15h5min.pdf (Braz.) (translated from original Portuguese to English by
author) [hereinafter Minas Report].
13. The micro-regional scale here defined as “ . . . [R]elated to destruction effects by the mud wave
generated by the dam rupture on the municipalities of Mariana, Barra Longa, Rio Doce and Santa Cruz
do Escalvado, including the affected districts.” Minas Report, supra note 12, at 8; see also id. at 62-65
(Such as exposure of animals to serious diseases; interruption of surveillance services in health,
epidemiological, sanitation, environmental and workers health; interruption of public security services;
hurt people; psychological impact for the affected population; losses to public health services; social
insecurity and fear of crime).
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impact on social organization and the economy.14 According to reported estimates,
the disaster caused an initial loss of R$1.2 billion in Minas Gerais alone, reaching 35
municipalities of that state and, indirectly, a population of 320,000 people as reported
by the Minas Gerais State Government task force.15
First, the Minas Report focused on the damages to public health and
fundamental safety conditions of people, including those who were wounded, dead,
or psychologically shaken.16 The report discussed problems related to the security of
the affected population, either by the suspension of their temporary shelter conditions
or by looting in properties that, though not destroyed, could not be used.17
Second, the report discussed the impact on the symbolic elements and the
impact to the access to education. The report notes that sacred works of art were
looted and destroyed – causing the loss of historical and cultural riches.18 There was
also disruption in education services.19 In Barra Longa, a municipality located in the
state of Minas Gerais, approximately 1,000 students were deprived of classes in the
municipal and state school network.20
Third, with respect to the impact to social organization and the economy,
there were changes in routine activities and the separation of neighbors within the
state as a result of the destruction noted above. With the destruction to bridges,
streets, roads and other public facilities the means of commuting and of congregating
were also destroyed.21 Following from the disruption to social organization there was
damage to the regional economy, resulting from suspending mining activities,
services and trade, and significant losses in rural production. In this aspect, the dam
disruption caused losses of approximately R$23.2 million to rural producers, only
considering the municipalities of Mariana, Barra Longa, Ponte Nova and Rio Doce,
according to data collected by the Company of Technical Assistance and Extension
of the State of Minas Gerais (EMATER-MG).22
In addition to these impacts, and in total, the report estimates that 311,000
people were diagnosed as being affected by the event. Contributing to the public
health impact to these people, the natural resources the population depended on were
affected. In Governador Valadares alone the water supply of 275,000 people was
compromised.23

14. See also id. at 65 (“The main impacts in this perspective are related to the interruption of the
schools functioning, either by destruction of structures and / or by impossibility of access, and, on the
other hand, the loss of articles of sacred art and other symbolic references of the culture of these
populations.”); see also id. at 67-68 (As examples the Report mentions physical separation of neighbors
and groups from a community and interruption/change in the routine activities of people affected.).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 62-63.
18. Id. at 66-67.
19. Id. at 66.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 49.
22. Minas Report, supra note 12, at 125.
23. Id.
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1.2. Environmental Impacts
As it remains impossible to ascertain all of the direct and indirect human
impacts of the disaster, it also is not yet possible to measure the full extent of the
environmental impacts. As of the publication of this article, the environmental
impacts are known to include the destruction of permanent preservation areas and
native vegetation of the Atlantic Forest; mortality of aquatic biodiversity and
terrestrial fauna; silting of water courses; disruption of water supply; interruption of
fishing for an indefinite period; loss and fragmentation of habitats; restriction or
weakening of ecosystem services; changes in the quality standards of fresh, brackish
and salt water.24
Of these environmental damages caused by the disaster, the following stand
out: i) damage to water quality and availability, ii) damage to soil quality and
availability, iii) damage to biodiversity iii) damage to soil composition and iv) the
impact to vegetation.25 First, the raw water of the water resources affected by the
sludge presented “turbidity and physicochemical characteristics different from the
historical average and outside the standards stipulated by the norms for
consumption.”26 Treated water, however, is “within the parameters considered safe
for consumption.”27
Second, there was damage to soil quality and availability. Specifically, the
chemical quality of the soil was affected with extremely low values for the main
nutrients of the soil, causing its fertility to be highly compromised.28 Thus, the soil
has lost its usability for the development of agricultural activities. However, although
the soil lost its fertility the contamination values were below the legal limit.
Third, there was damage to the biodiversity in the area. Specifically, there
was impact to fish and crustacean mortality, as well as the physico-chemical
alteration in the water.”29 In addition to the visible mortality of fish and crustaceans
along the 600 km of affected water resources, the physico-chemical changes caused
by the mud also impacted the entire trophic chain, involving the planktonic
community, aquatic invertebrates, fish, amphibians, reptiles and mammals that
depend directly and indirectly from the waters of the Doce River.30 Such changes
may lead to greater threat of extinction to endangered species and even to previously
abundant species.31
Fourth, the chemical quality of the soil was affected causing the
composition of the main nutrients of the soil to change which caused the soil fertility
to be highly compromised.32 Thus, the soil lost its usability for the development of
agricultural activities.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See generally IBAMA Report, supra note 4.
Minas Report, supra note 12, at 21.
Id. (translated from original Portuguese to English by author).
Id.
Id. at 25.
IBAMA Report, supra note 4, at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, the impact on vegetation included the “destruction of 1,469
hectares along 77 km of watercourses, including permanent preservation areas.”33
According to the Instituto Estadual de Florestas - IEF [Minas Gerais State Forestry
Institute] report on the affected vegetation cover, two types of areas were classified,
one main scene (Santarém and Fundão dams, up to the Gualaxo do Norte river
towards the Carmo river), where impact is estimated at 560.35 hectares, 384.71
hectares of which are Atlantic Forest; and adjacent areas (subsequent to the main
scene, following the extension of the Gualaxo do Norte river towards the Rio Doce
estuary), an estimated 1,026.65 hectares of vegetation coverage , 126.37 hectares of
which being Atlantic Forest.34 Of note is the fact that ecosystem loss leads to an
increase in local vulnerability, affecting regional resilience capacity. After the
disaster, the loss of fishing capacity and impairment of other economic activities in
the Rio Doce basin impacts, above all, quality of life. Ecosystem services are critical
in the aftermath to provide minimal living conditions, such as food, water, extractive
activities, shelter, for the affected community.
Ultimately, the Mariana Disaster and its aftermath had extensive direct and
indirect human and environmental impacts. It is important to understand the
significance of a disaster such as this in order to understand the great necessity to
incorporate risk management contingency plans into the governmental structure in
advance of such disasters.
2. LESSON OF MARIANA DISASTER: INCORPORATION OF RISK
MANAGEMENT PLANNING INTO GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE.
Historically, disasters stimulate prevention and trigger the rise of regulatory
parameters in a particular sector of the economy, such as in the chemical industry
(Bophal), nuclear power generation (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island and Fukushima),
offshore oil exploration (BP Oil Spill) and its transport (Exxon-Valdez), among
many other examples. In this sense, great emphasis is given to the pedagogical and
learning aspect from disasters,35 since catastrophic accidents are often the result of a
regulatory deficit, especially in environmental matters. The lesson from these
anthropogenic disasters, including the Mariana Disaster, however, is that this historic
and practiced human response to disaster ought to instead transition into advance
disaster planning and governmental regulation with a goal of anticipating the
necessary response and implementing the mechanisms prior to a time of emergency.
Creating a risk management culture.
2.1. Absence of a Circular Risk Management Culture in Brazil
The lack of attention and awareness for the need of circular risk
management contributes to risk and cost escalation associated with disasters.36 The
33. Id. at 10.
34. Minas Report, supra note 12, at 26.
35. See generally Sheila Jasanoff, Introduction to LEARNING FROM DISASTER: RISK MANAGEMENT
AFTER BHOPAL 1, 11-21 (Sheila Jasanoff, ed., 1994).
36. Daniel A. Farber, Introduction: Legal Scholarship, the Disaster Cycle, and the Fukushima
Accident, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 4 (2012), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/delpf/vol23/iss1/1
at2-5; Robert R. M. Verchick, Disaster Justice: The Geography of Human Capability, 23 DUKE ENVTL.
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institution of risk management in all phases of a disaster scenario is only possible
through a normative attribution of this constitutive assumption in Disaster Law.
Since disasters are due to physical or social vulnerabilities, legal systems are deemed
to play a leading role in the fight against social and environmental injustices. Once
the legal systems are in place, adoption of risk management into the very culture is
required in order to have proper mitigation of future disaster impacts as established
in the Disaster Law stages.
2.1.1. Disaster Law Theory.
Generally, disasters have a triggering cycle, the understanding of which is
necessary for any analysis, whether it is about disaster prevention, occurrence, or the
posture adopted post factum. The modality of Disaster Law has defined this ‘life
cycle’ of a disaster. In Disaster Law, a disaster’s life is comprised of several stages
including: prevention and risk mitigation, the occurrence of the disaster itself, the
emergency response, ways of compensation and, finally, reconstruction, as shown
below.

Figure 1. Disaster Law Cycle37
Disaster Law is constituted, in its unity and identity, by an integration of
these various stages and strategies used to describe and analyze an event of this
nature. This branch of law plays a prominent role in all phases of a disaster, with
lawyers, members of the Judiciary and public managers having to adopt anticipatory
measures and responses in a coordinated manner throughout all stages.38
What is common to all these steps is the necessary risk management
incorporated into their functional specificities. Disaster Law is unified by risk
management. In other words, the link between the elements of this structure is
provided by necessary risk management at each stage, establishing a circle of risk

L. & POL’Y F. 23, 26-27 (2012), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/delpf/vol23/iss1/1; Daniel Farber,
International Law and Disaster Cycle, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DISASTER RELIEF 9-10 (David D.
Caron, Michael J. Kelly, & Anastasia Telesetsky eds., 2014).
37. Daniel Farber, Direito Dos Desastres e Questões Emergentes no Brasil, 4(1) REVISTA DE
ESTUDOS CONSTITUCIONAIS, HERMENÊUTICA E TEORIA DO DIREITO-(RECHTD) 2, 6 (2012) (Braz.).
38. See generally Daniel Farber Introduction: The Role of Lawyers in a Disaster-Prone World, 31
NOVA L. REV. 403 (2006).
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management.39 This circular management of disaster risks consists of a sub-circle of
interconnected strategies that links the disaster cycle itself (See Fig. 1).40 The
description provided by this cycle not only demonstrates the preventive role that
permeates Disaster Law (due to the magnitude and the uncertainties involved in the
diagnosis of probabilities) but also allows the constitution of the objectives of this
branch of law.41 Thus, the emergency response, compensation, and reconstruction
measures themselves must manage the risks of new disasters, circling in an integrated
way around the prevention of new disasters.
The disaster cycle therefore serves as an important analytical tool for
prevention, planning, and response to future disasters by orienting the societal
analysis on present disasters of this nature and using the fallout of present disasters
to instruct the establishment of new systems and mechanisms in anticipation of future
disasters. Specifically the disaster cycle stages may be employed in order to conduct
prevention planning, risk assessment and mitigation, or to design adequate
emergency responses, ensure accountability and compensation for present and future
disasters, and plan reconstructions that mitigate the potential of future disasters).
This risk management approach fosters an analytical, systemic, and constructivist
response to disaster. In this sense, the interaction of each of the phases of circular
risk management not only provides the fundamental underpinnings of Disaster Law
but also serves to supply specific objectives and functions upon which society may
act.
2.1.2. Historical Absence of Circular Risk Management in Brazil.
As already diagnosed in studies conducted in Brazil, there is a low culture
of disaster risk management in Brazil,42 which has the effect of increasing the
probability of serious disasters, whether natural or anthropogenic. The regulatory
deficit (inspection and compliance with the law) is historically known as potential
factor for increasing the catastrophic risk probabilities of most environmental
disasters. Additionally, a low level of compliance with existing legal regulations also
increases catastrophic risk. Regarding the Mariana disaster and its overwhelming
severity, some signs of regulatory failures should be mentioned.
One example of how the Mariana Disaster illustrates the regulatory deficit
in Brazil is the regulatory failure in assessing the mining company’s environmental
license. According to a recent statement by the Public Prosecutor’s Office “only
basic data regarding the enterprise [was] presented at the time of the licensing
39. DANIEL A. FARBER, JIM CHEN, ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK & LISA GROW SUN, DISASTER LAW AND
POLICY 1, 3-4 (Aspen Pub. 2d ed., 2010); see also Daniel Farber, Symposium Introduction: Navigating
the Intersection of Environmental Law and Disaster Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1783 (2011),
http://lawreview.byu.edu/articles/1325732020_01Farber.FIN.pdf.
40. Daniel A. Farber, Introduction: Legal Scholarship, the Disaster Cycle, and the Fukushima
Accident, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 4 (2012), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/delpf/vol23/iss1/1.
41. On the objects and functional objectives structuring Disaster Law see Délton Winter de Carvalho,
Desastres Ambientais e sua Regulação Jurídica: Deveres de Prevenção, Resposta e Compensação,
EDITORA REVISTA DOS TRIBUNAIS LTDA 46-48 (2015) (Braz.).
42. INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION
RELATED TO DISASTER RISK REDUCTION IN BRAZIL 18-19, 50 (2012), http://drr-law.org/resources/BrazilCase-Study.pdf; Ministério Da Integração Nacional, Plano Nacional de Gestão de Riscos e Resposta a
Desastres – PNGRD: Diagnóstico 2012, Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 66 (2012).
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process, and [ . . . ] authorization was nevertheless granted.”43 Between the years
2013 to 2015, there were documented findings of dam rupture risks. The company
claimed to have adopted all technical measures to mitigate the known risks.44 Thus,
there are crucial doubts that environmental agencies or the mining company
entrepreneur gave due attention to the risks involved in the venture.45 In light of the
documented dam rupture risks, the absence of an executive design for the project
was striking and drew attention of government officials and the Public Prosecutor’s
Office. This sort of regulatory loop hole constituted a failure of the legal framework
to anticipate a potential disaster.
After a Brazilian history of legislation that only focused on promoting
response and reconstruction in the event of “natural” disasters, (Federal Decree
7,257/2010 and Federal Law 12,340 / 2010), Law no. 12,608/12, established the
National Policy on Protection and Civil Defense - NPPCD, which instead
emphasized prevention of disasters. 46, 47, 48 In this sense, the priority of preventive
actions related to the minimization of natural disasters was a newly established
guideline of national policy, and disaster risk reduction was one of its objectives. 49,
50
However, what this new legislation failed to do was account for man-made
disasters, such as that which occurred at Mariana. Thus, after a legal tradition
centered on merely corrective actions, new Brazilian legislation did emphasize the
centrality of prevention and, consequently, the necessary management of risks in all
phases of the natural disaster circle. Risk management is relevant both in the
development of prevention strategies and in the response to disasters, mitigating the
disaster in question and also preventing new occurrences. The new legislation (Law
No. 12,608 /12) showed the “systemic approach to prevention, mitigation,
preparedness, response and recovery actions” as a structural guideline. It adopted a
circular and systemic basis for risk management of disaster, combining strategies of
prevention, mitigation, response, compensation and recovery under the logic of
circularity in catastrophic risk management.51 Thus, anticipation and response were
united under the aegis of necessary and constant risk management. Despite the new
43. MP de Minas Gerais vê Falhas em Licenciamento da Barragem de Fundão, O GLOBO (Jan. 18,
2016), http://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/mp-de-minas-gerais-ve-falhas-em-licenciamento-da-barragem-defundao-18494612 (Braz.).
44. Id.
45. Environmental Licensing is the main tool for risk assessment in Brazil. Every potential polluter
activity needs a license approving its locational and environmental feasibility, installation and operation.
Through this administrative procedure the environmental agency must ask for and analyze studies such
as construction projects, risk assessments, environmental impact assessments, contingency plans, dam
safety plans, and so on.
46. Decreto No. 7.257, de 4 de Agosto de 2010, DIÁRO OFICIAL DA UNIÁO [D.O.U.] de 8.23.2019,
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2010/decreto/d7257.htm (Braz.).
47. Lei No. 12.340, de 1 de Dezembro de 2010, COL. LEIS REP. FED. BRASIL, http://www.planalto.
gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2010/lei/l12340.htm (Braz.).
48. Lei No. 12.608, de 10 de Abril de 2012, COL. LEIS REP. FED. BRASIL, http://www.planalto.
gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/lei/l12608.htm (Braz.).
49. Id. at art. 4 (The following are guidelines of the National Policy on Civil Protection and Defense:
“( . . . ) III - priority to preventive actions related to disaster minimization. “).
50. Id at art. 5 (“Art. 5. PNPDEC’s objectives are: I - to reduce the risks of disasters.”).
51. Id. at art. 4 (“Art. 4. PNPDEC guidelines are: . . . II - systemic approach to prevention, mitigation,
preparedness, response and recovery actions. “).

Summer 2019

THE ORE TAILINGS DAM RUPTURE

291

legal framework, and because such framework omitted potential man-made
disasters, there remained a low culture for risk management in Brazil. Perhaps this
was because of a misconception that the country was historically immune to
disasters, a belief strongly held by the Brazilian population due to the fact that Brazil
has not had any major earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes or other natural disasters
common in other parts of the world. Further, Mariana was the first really catastrophic
man-made disaster to occur in Brazil, thus contributing to the populations belief that
such disasters were not possible. In addition to the low legal acknowledgement, there
also remained a low juridical sensitivity to scientific information.52 It should be noted
that this institutional insensitivity to catastrophic risk was reflected in a lack of
commitment by officials and even in the community to the necessity of circular
management of catastrophic risks at all stages of an extreme event, i.e. prevention,
emergency response, compensation and reconstruction as discussed above. As a
result, the impacts of the Mariana Disaster were made greater in absence of the
mechanisms of the Disaster Law stages.
2.1.3. Disaster Law Stages Applied to Mariana Disaster.
Under Disaster Law, there are several phases including the prevention/risk
management phase and then following a disaster, the emergency response phase, the
compensation stage, and the rebuilding stage cycling back to the prevention/risk
management stage. In applying these stages to the Mariana Disaster this article
attempts to use that disaster to illustrate how application of Disaster Law theory
would mitigate the impact of future disasters.
With respect to the initial prevention/risk management phase, the Mariana
disaster, illustrates the significant flaws in the application and design of venture
process. There was limited attention by the environmental agencies to the risks
involved during environmental licensing, either due to a lack of attention to
previously diagnosed structural problems or to deficient monitoring. These scenarios
show what I have called technological vulnerability:53 a lack of constant information
production and flow needed to prevent disasters and environmental damage from
economic activities.54 From a preventative standpoint, technological accidents are
often due to the public administration’s ignorance of what information it should
require from the entrepreneur,55 as part of its legitimate exercise of the power of
administrative police. The lack of technical knowledge sometimes leads to an
inability to demand prevention, since what is not known cannot be prevented. These
practices of a low-risk management culture makes it difficult to rationally and

52. On the relationship between scientific analysis and law, see generally SHEILA JASANOFF,
SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 1, 6 (1995); DÉLTON WINTER DE
CARVALHO, DANO AMBIENTAL FUTURO: A RESPONSABILIZAÇÃO CIVIL PELO RISCO 1, 124-32 (Livraria
do Advogado Editora, 2013) (Braz.).
53. Carvalho, supra note 41, at 83.
54. According to Sheila Jassanof the right to know about risks establishes (i) who has the right to
know; (ii) who has the duty to provide the information; (iii) what information is more relevant to be
provided. See Sheila Jassanof, The Bophal Disaster and the Right to Know, 27 SOC. SCI. MED. 1.117-22,
n.10 (1988).
55. Jassanof, supra note 35, at 8-12.
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properly assess the environmental risks involved making prevention planning of
disasters harder.
Following a disaster such as that in Mariana, the failure in managing
catastrophic risks became all the more evident in the response phase. This phase
includes the preparation (plans and training) and the (actual) response to disasters.56
This is a fundamental phase to mitigate the magnitude of harmful events. Depending
on the response effectiveness the disaster may cause higher or lower losses. The
striking unpreparedness following the Mariana Disaster, due to the lack of adequate
plans for dams according to Law 12344/2010, for emergencies, as well as of
technical training resulted in public and private inability to act quickly and
effectively in the emergency response itself. Specifically, the inadequate response to
the Mariana Disaster included the absence of orderly response planning, of an
effective alarm system, and of an early documentary description of worst-case
scenarios. The low relevance attributed to Emergency or Contingency Plans required
for high impact activities and cities subject to disasters57 was further impacted due
to lack of clarity about the minimum contents required for such plans and by not
having established standards for preparing and presenting dam and emergency plans.
Far from being an essential tool to proper risk management, response planning
instead ends up being a mere bureaucratic formality causing the impact of a disaster
such as Mariana to have far greater reach. This article later contains extensive
discussion. On emergency planning that could or should have been done prior to the
Mariana Disaster, or which could have been instituted following the disaster.
In compensation phase following Mariana, there was an explosion of
judicial litigation with individual and collective demands bringing to light the
fragility of the judiciary to deal with situations of judicial attendance to disasters.
The connection between disasters and lawsuits is not new, it has been observed in
the aftermath of both Hurricane Katrina and the terrorist attack of September 11th in
the United States of America.58 The fragility of the judiciary in Brazil had already
been established by prior disasters. For example, in Brazil, the disaster from sudden
floods in the mountainous region of the State of Rio de Janeiro in 2011 resulted in
Recommendation 40 of the National Justice Council - CNJ of 2012,59 which
56. Carvalho, supra note 52, at 115-24.
57. See MINISTÉRIO DO MEIO AMBIENTE, PLANO NACIONAL DE PREVENÇÃO, PREPARAÇÃO E
RESPOSTA RÁPIDA A EMERGÊNCIAS AMBIENTAIS COM PRODUTOS QUÍMICOS PERIGOSOS - P2R2 2,
http://www.mma.gov.br/estruturas/sqa_p2r2_1/_arquivos/proposta_do%20_P2R2.pdf
(Concerning
dangerous chemicals); see also Marília Loschi, Desastres Naturais: 59,4% Dos Municípios não têm Plano
de Gestão de Riscos, AGÊNCIA IBGE NOTÍCIAS, https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/agencia-noticias/
2012-agencia-de-noticias/noticias/21633-desastres-naturais-59-4-dos-municipios-nao-tem-plano-degestao-de-riscos (“Of the 5,570 Brazilian municipalities, more than half (59.4%) did not have planning
and risk management instruments in 2017”). In the specific case of the Mariana Disaster it is known that
Samarco contracted an Emergency Plan but never put into practice. See Gustavo Werneck, Samarco
Contratou Plano de Emergência Contra Desastres, Mas Nunca pôs em Prática, EM (Nov. 24, 2015, 6:00
AM), https://www.em.com.br/app/noticia/gerais/2015/11/24/interna_gerais,710870/samarco-contratouplano-de-emergencia-para-desastre-mas-nunca-pos-em.shtml.
58. Thomas A. Birkland, Emergency Management and Courts in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, in
CATASTROPHE: LAW, POLICY, & HUMANITARIAN IMPULSE 116, 123 (Austin Sarat & Javier Lezaun, eds.,
2009).
59. See CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, RECOMENDAÇÃO Nº 40 DE 13/06/2012, http://www.
cnj.jus.br/atos-normativos?documento=841 (Braz.).
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recommended to the State Courts that the courts were to prepare Contingency Plans
for the Judiciary enabling them to stay operational in extreme cases. Although this
recommendation dealt primarily with so-called natural disasters, nothing prevented
its use for so-called anthropogenic disasters. However, despite having this legal
instrument the absence of structural legal theory to put these instruments effectively
into practice contributed to the judiciary remaining fragile several years later when
the Mariana Disaster occurred. In effect, despite having Recommendation 40, the
courts have failed to implement and adopt it. Had the State Court in Minas Gerais
done so and established a Court Contingency Plan, the Judicial answer to the Mariana
disaster response and compensation would have been faster and more effective. The
consequence of this has been thousands of lawsuits for which the State Judiciary was
not prepared.
Generally speaking, disaster compensation methods consist largely of
jurisdictional litigation in the form of civil liability for damages and risk and
insurance and government assistance. In case of an industrial accident, there is a
historical trend of greater emphasis on the application of the civil liability institute
due to damages of individual and collective nature.60 In the absence of governmental
assistance to help those affected by industrial accidents, the pure civil liability route
is slow, complex and at times very fragmented. In light of this, the formation of funds
for victim assistance has proven to be an adequate alternative for the speedy and
global aid to those affected. In such cases, legislation is enacted by a jurisdiction
requiring that an entrepreneur obtain and provide proof of adequate insurance
coverage, a special fund, to cover potential victims of an entrepreneur’s operation.
In absence of such a fund, mass litigation (tort) results supplemented by government
assistance programs. The mining company here, Samarco, is owned by the two
largest mining companies in the world (VALE and BHP). These companies did
create a Foundation to manage the emergency financial aid and compensation to the
victims, In the Mariana disaster the amounts to which the entrepreneur was supposed
to have been insured were insufficient to cover the losses hitherto verified.61 In
moving forward from Mariana, and in effectively incorporating the compensation
phase of Disaster Law, legislation could be enacted requiring mining companies
maintain a disaster fund thereby ensuring that future victims would have immediate
compensation without extensive litigation.
The phase of reconstruction and recovery completes the circle of risk
management, seeking to take measures to prevent or at least mitigate new disasters.
The reconstruction and recovery phase is meant to aim at the recovery of material
goods and reestablishing stability in the social, economic and environmental
dimensions of the affected community. The ultimate goal of this phase is to aim for
an improved future scenario where society is more resilient and less vulnerable to

60. Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katrina, and 9/11: Exploring Liability
for
Extraordinary
Risks,
43
VAL.
U.
L.
REV.
1075,
1079
(2009),
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/4; see also Carvalho, supra note 52, at 129-40.
61. Leonardo Augusto (PMDB / MG), Seguro da Samarco não é Suficiente Para Pagar Indenizaç,
ESTADÃO (Nov. 16, 2015), http://brasil.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,seguro-da-samarco-nao-e-sufici
ente-para-pagar-indenizacoes,10000002106 (stating that new Mining Code, the mining company
Samarco’s insurance is 1 billion dollars, equivalent to R $ 3.8 billion reais, would require a value between
R $ 10 and 14 billion.) (Braz.).
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future disasters. It should be emphasized, therefore, that due to the severity of the
effects in the case of the Samarco disaster, the post-disaster scenario offered the
opportunity to establish a new normality, since, in view of the irreversible damages
which were already known, a return to an old normality was not possible. In other
words, the reconstruction and recovery of the Rio Doce basin and the affected
communities in Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo offered the opportunity to address
some of the necessary objectives for the formation of greater community resilience.
However, while the monitoring was initially being improved, another mine tailings
dam disaster collapsed in January 2019. As with the dam collapse in Mariana, this
second dam collapse this year also followed internal reporting that the dam was at
risk.62 So, the new normality has seemingly become a degraded environment and the
failure to take action to prevent future man-made disasters of this sort.
Ideally the reconstruction and recovery phase should have proceeded
differently, and as part of this resilience planning, authorities should have
acknowledged the need for more complete scientific understanding of the damage
caused by disaster to ecosystem services and the encouragement to these services to
recovery, maintenance and assessment. Additionally, extreme anthropogenic and
natural scenarios must be anticipated in the process of reconstruction and urban
planning of towns in the affected communities. Specifically, there remains a need for
the urbanistic choices made in the rebuilding of devastated areas to include avoiding
occupation of future vulnerable areas.
2.2. The importance of emergency plans for both the private sector and the
judiciary
Creation of emergency or contingency plans is an integral part of the
application of disaster cycle. In the case of the mining company Samarco in Minas
Gerais, the media reported that the Emergency Plan the company had made contained
an erroneous estimate of the environmental risks of a possible dam rupture with
mining tailings.63 According to news stories, the risks that were incorporated in said
plan was imprecisely or insufficiently assessed, as the documents submitted to the
environmental agency foresaw the arrival of the mud only up to the “urbanized area
of the district of Bento Rodrigues”, whereas a posteriori its capacity was found to
reach far beyond this point, having actually covered approximately 700 km.64

62. Brumadinho Dam Collapse in Brazil: Vale Mine Chief Resigns, BBC NEWS (Mar. 3, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47432134.
63. See Plano de Emergência da Samarco Previa Lama só em Bento Rodrigues, G1 (Dec. 19, 2015,
8:53 PM), http://g1.globo.com/minas-gerais/desastre-ambiental-em-mariana/noticia/2015/12/plano-deemergencia-da-samarco-previa-lama-so-em-bento-rodrigues.html ( Braz.); see also Estêvão Bertoni,
Juliana Coissi, & Jose Marques, Plano de Emergência de Mineradora Samarco Ignora Alerta a
Moradores, FOLHA DE S. PAULO (Nov. 21, 2015, 2:00 AM), https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano
/2015/11/1709264-plano-de-emergencia-de-mineradora-samarco-ignora-alerta-a-moradores.shtml.
64. G1, supra note 63 (The study appearing in the 2008 Fundão dam license presents three scenarios
for the case of disruption, with differences in speed, width and height that the mud wave would reach. But
in all cases, only the “urbanized area of the Bento Rodrigues district” is cited.); see also Estêvão Bertoni
& Nicola Pamplona, Estudo da Samarco não Previa Danos no Rio Doce e em Distritos de MG, FOLHA
DE S. PAULO (Dec. 15, 2015, 8:46 AM), https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2015/12/1719134estudo-da-samarco-nao-previa-danos-em-paracatu-e-barra-longa.shtml.

Summer 2019

THE ORE TAILINGS DAM RUPTURE

295

According to the Emergency Plan, the company affirmed it followed all the
steps predicted in its Emergency Plan presented to the pertinent agencies.65
Furthermore, according to the contracted authors of the Emergency Plan, they had
delivered to the contracting company a study that also considered the scenario of
mud covering up to Barra Longa, that is, approximately 75 km down from the dam.66
Without going into the merits of this information, it reveals an evident deficit in the
administration and assessment of catastrophic risks in the country. This is not new.
If that information is true, the risk scenario described to the environmental agency
considered the mud reaching only Bento Rodrigues, a municipality located only 2.5
km from the dam. Thus the entire licensing process can be deemed as permeated by
this underestimation of environmental risk regarding the distance the mud would
cover in case of structural failure. Thus, it can be said that the discrepancy between
the risk presented and managed in the environmental licensing procedure, in this
respect alone, is equivalent to 0.35% of the real distance covered by the mud. Even
if the distance of the mud to the city of Barra Longa (75 km down) were adopted as
a parameter for the study presented, it would still be a risk assessment of only 10%
of the distance actually traveled by the tailings in the disaster. The absence of a
precautionary or preventive standard minimally related to the real scenario, either by
the entrepreneur or by the pertinent administrative environmental agency, is
undeniable. The discrepancy between the risk scenario presented and the real
unfolding of the disaster is 99% in one case, and 90% in the other, depending on the
version presented (to Bento Rodrigues or Barra Longa).
In more general terms, Emergency or contingency plans consist of
fundamental studies for the diagnosis and adoption of preventive measures, as well
as the assignment of responsibilities and ordered actions for emergency response to
ongoing disasters.67 Emergency Plans respond to the need for an early reflection on
the risks of an activity, designing measures for each of the possible scenarios. In this
sense, one of the fundamental lessons from the Mariana disaster and many other
industrial accidents is the need for preemptive planning and preparation, otherwise
the reaction capacity of responsible public and private bodies will be severely
compromised.
2.2.1. Emergency or Contingency Plans
Disaster Emergency or Contingency Plans should contain actual planning
studies designed to minimize impact and vulnerability in the event of a disaster, as
well as to facilitate reconstruction efforts68 and shall encompass all phases of the
disaster cycle, including prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response,
rehabilitation and reconstruction. Plans are often criticized for being static and
merely routine measures, however, they have important value in the process of their
design and drafting, requiring that organizations not only maintain directions and
planning for response actions, but further requiring organization to think through

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See generally Denis Binder, Emergency Action Plans: A Legal and Practical Blueprint Failing
to Plan is Planning to Fail, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 791, 791 (2002).
68. Id.
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potential future disaster risks.69 These plans are often required by law or by discretion
of the administrative environmental agency, especially for those activities potentially
causing significant environmental degradation or risks of abnormal hazards.70
Ultimately, emergency plans (i) arise from a standard of care incorporating a
reasonable duty of care, (ii) they have certain defined elements that must be included
in order for them to be successful, (iii) they may be developed at multiple levels
within the society including the government and the judiciary, and (iv) they serve the
preliminary function of guiding the emergency response phase following a disaster.
First, these emergency or contingency plans are often directly linked to
professional standards of care, that is, the standards adopted in a given area.71 The
standard of minimum care required is plans must anticipate, prevent, and mitigate
the flaws and consequences related to rationally predicted risk (including in
construction, design, operation, procedures, etc.).72 To this end, such plans must
present rational steps to be taken in cases of extreme events, be they natural, manmade, or of mixed nature. These steps taken together form a duty of care that plan
authors, and the entities that employ them, owe to the broader society. It is notable
that this duty is one of a reasonable standard of care, not one of guaranteed success
prevention of an extreme event.73 In other words, it should be made clear that if the
plan had to bring full efficiency to extreme events, it would be subject to a pattern of
obligation of result, which is too demanding for catastrophic, often uncertain, events
with low probability. The safety standard applicable in cases of emergency plans is
reflected in the duty to provide reasonable care to be taken in the design of
emergency preparedness and response strategies for a given event, without requiring
full effectiveness. It is, therefore, an obligation of means, not of ends or result.74 This
duty of care, as already mentioned, must be delimited by the standard arising from
the “professional standard of care”.75
Second, and flowing from this standard of care and the duty owed to society,
emergency or contingency plans must clearly define the following: (i) the roles and
responsibilities of the organizations involved in emergency responses; (ii) the
structure and formation of a crisis office; (iii) the identification of risks and
particularly vulnerable areas; (iv) the inventory of physical, human and financial
resources available and the procedure to access them; v) strategic location of
resources and supplies; vi) determination and signaling of evacuation routes and
areas for temporary accommodation of those affected; (vii) a network of internal
communications and public information; (viii) descriptions of lessons learned from
previous events, and the respective duty of attention to these lessons, in order to
avoid recurring misunderstandings and to encourage the adoption of best practices.
If all emergency plans adhere to and include this information, the plans will likely
not only meet the basic standards of care, but will be more successful in anticipating,

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Birkland, supra note 58, at 123.
See Binder, supra note 67, at 800-01.
Id. at 805-08.
Id. at 794-95.
Id. at 803-04.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 806.
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preventing, and mitigating the flaws and consequences related to rationally predicted
disasters.
Third, emergency or contingency plans may be developed at many different
levels within the society including the governmental or sectoral level and the
judiciary level. In this sense, there are statutes requiring Contingency Plans for public
entities, mainly focused in dealing with the so-called “natural disasters.” In other
cases, highly dangerous industrial activities are required by law to present
Emergency Plans. In sum, for all public entitles there is a requirement for a Civil
Defense and Protection Plan, but for all industrial activities, additional emergency
plans are required. At the government or sectoral level, after the promulgation of
Law No. 12,608 / 12, all federal levels (Union, States, Federal District and
Municipalities) must have their respective emergency or contingency plans.76
Currently, the civil defense and protection plans are limited to contemplation of
natural disasters (mainly focused in meteorological, hydrological, geological and
biological hazards, although the statute also mentions nuclear and chemical hazards).
However, this requirement should not be limited to cases of so-called natural disaster
risks; it is also of great importance for the plans to contemplate preparedness
regarding man-made disasters. In the case of disasters considered in the National
Policy on Civil Protection and Defense, the elaboration of contingency plans has
become a duty of care normatively imposed in Brazil, and each government entity
must prepare the respective contingency plan. In Brazil, the law requires that for
industrial activities, the mining sector is required to issue and present emergency
plans to public officials through an administrative hearing. This requirement is
imposed by a federal statute entitled the National Dam Safety Policy Act and requires
the company to present a dam safety plan.77 Where failure to comply with this duty
has led or contributed to a disaster, there may be civil liability of the institutions
obliged to prepare and implement the plans, in three scenarios: (i) in the absence of
an emergency plan; ii) when it proves to be inadequate; iii) failure to follow and
implement the plan.78 Thus, specific risk activities and those normatively obligated
to prepare such plans must carry them out from a rationally predictable risk pattern,
developing and adopting strategies, responses, and mitigation steps.
These plans are also developed at the judiciary level. To this end, it is
interesting to note that on June 13, 2012, the National Council of Justice (NCJ) issued
Recommendation No. 40, which instructed the states’ Courts of Justice to prepare
Action Plans to deal with and solve situations arising from catastrophes and
environmental disasters.79 These Judiciary Emergency Plans are meant to address
situations so serious that an operational change in the judicial service of the affected
community is justified, as long as an emergency or state of public calamity is
declared.80 This recommendation was important because the lack of planning by the
76. Lei No. 12.608 de 10 de Abril de 2012, at arts. 6, VIII, 7, III, and 8, XI,
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/lei/l12608.htm.
77. Lei No. 12.334 de 10 de Setembro de 2010 at art I, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03
/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12334.htm.
78. Binder, supra note 67, at 793.
79. Conselho Nacional de Justiça, Recomendação Nº 40 de 13/06/2012, http://www.cnj.jus.br/atosnormativos?documento=841 (Braz.).
80. Id.
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Judiciary itself at the local level has always been of particular concern, as was
demonstrated by the difficulties experienced in the mountainous region of the State
of Rio de Janeiro in 2011.81 This lack of planning at the judiciary level was not
unique to Brazil. In New Orleans after being hit by Katrina in 2005 similar issues
were experienced.82 In the North American case, the criminal system collapsed and
was not operational.83 Arising out of this system failure, the Louisiana Supreme
Court following the disaster encouraged local courts to have a plan and structure to
anticipate disasters. Some of these plans included having computer back-ups of and
easy access to information about court servants and officials.84 Thus, judicial courts
must understand and inform their own priorities and action steps, in the form of
emergency or contingency plans, in order to effectively respond to possible or
recurrent disasters.
Finally, the Emergency Plans have the preliminary function of guiding the
emergency response phase, establishing functions, structures and decision criteria
for this phase of relief to the victims and restoration of essential public services.
However, it should not be forgotten that these instruments (Plans) also have a
preventive function, since they require the diagnosis of scenarios and early technical
reflections on the activity catastrophic potential. What the present case demonstrates
is that a low attention and perception to the necessary circular risk management by
the community, agencies and company played a prominent role in the occurrence of
the event or at least contributed to the catastrophic consequences of the event. If there
is any doubt about the preventive functions of an Emergency Plan, this case serves
to dissipate them. In the case of the Mariana disaster, the need for early analysis
should have demonstrated a greater variation in the scenarios designed in case of
rupture. It is noteworthy that in all scenarios described in the company’s Emergency
Plan, the tailings would have the same final destination, Bento Rodrigues, 2.5 km
away from the dam that collapsed. As seen, the forecast that the tailings would arrive
only at Bento Rodrigues, when in fact they reached 700 km from the rupture site,
attests a deviation of the expected magnitude (between drawn scenarios and postdisaster reality) of 99%. In other words, this was the case of an absolute
unpredictable event (ignorance) for the standard of professional care or almost the
complete absence of an accurate and feasible risk management.

81. See Vladimir Passos de Freitas, O Direito dos Desastres Chega ao Brasil e Reclama
Especialistas, CONSULTOR JURÍDICO (Sept. 24, 2017, 10:39 AM), https://www.conjur.com.br/2017-set24/segunda-leitura-direito-desastres-chega-brasil-reclama-especialistas (stating that “[d]isasters create a
number of legal problems. Some should be addressed as they occur or soon after. For example, bodies
may have to be buried, even if the deceased are not identified. Orphans may need temporary custody for
the urgent practice of acts of civil life. Problems of this type arose in the mountainous region of the State
of Rio de Janeiro which, in January 2011, was hit by flooding and landslides that affected seven cities,
leaving a balance of about one thousand dead.”) (translated from original Portuguese to English by author)
(Braz.).
82. See generally Birkland, supra note 58.
83. Id. at 122-23.
84. Id. at 121.
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2.2.2 Contingency Plans in EU: Brief Case Study
As a point of comparison, attention should be drawn to the description of
Emergency Plans by the European Community Directive 96/82 (known as SEVESO
II), intended to prevent major accidents involving dangerous substances. According
to it, specifically in its Article 1185, Emergency Plans should be designed in such a
way as to delimit and control serious industrial incidents, minimizing their effects,
and limiting damage to humans and the environment.86 To that end, such plans must
clearly state: protective measures to be applied in the event of a major accident;
procedures and people responsible for informing the public and the authorities;
provisions for environmental recovery and sanitation following a major accident.87
According to this Directive, the operator shall draw up an internal
emergency plan designed to be applied within the establishment and provide the
pertinent authorities with the information necessary to enable them to draw up the
external emergency plan.88 Thus, the plans are made to cover the internal (own
operator) as well as the external service (pertinent authorities) meeting the
emergency. Internal staff shall be consulted (employees, subcontractors and others)
on the elements of the internal plan, and the community in the area of influence
should be consulted on the content of the external plan.
In anticipatory manner, periodical communication to the people who may
be affected, at least every five years, is also provided for in Article 13 of Seveso II.89
The information has to be reviewed by the operator at least every three years.90 This
communication must contain adequate instructions for correct action in the event of
a major accident. Emergency Plans should be reviewed, updated and rehearsed at
intervals not exceeding three years.91
3. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Unfortunately, lessons are learned from catastrophes and in turn they play
a prominent role in the evolution of Environmental Law by way of response instead
of anticipatory action. In order for disasters to spur changes in human response,
information and statistical data about their causes and consequences must be
produced and assimilated. This collective energy must necessarily be channeled into
the production of constructive reflections on the role of the Law in imposing disaster
prevention duties. Disasters often reveal the convergence of faulty risk management,
either in analyzing the magnitude or in diagnosing the event probabilities. This
regulatory deficit largely correlates with a lack of conscious imposition of standards
of care implementing reasonable legal duties upon organizations, governmental

85. Council of the European Union, No. 96/82/EC of 9 Dec. 1996, art. 11, 1996 O.J. (L 010) 001333, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31996L0082.
86. Id.
87. The European Parliament and the Counsel of the European Union, No. 2012/18/EU of 4 July
2012, art. 12, 2012 O.J. (L 197) 1-37, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
CELEX:32012L0018&from=pt.
88. Id. at 4.
89. Id. at 11.
90. Id. at 10.
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entities, and the judiciary in an attempt to incorporate circular risk management into
the societal structure.
In this sense, at least two points deserve to be highlighted in the case of the
Mariana environmental disaster of November 2015. First, the law must consider
circularity in the process of managing exponential risks. Second, attention must be
paid to the scientific analysis, formation and implementation of solid Emergency
Plans for activities with abnormal or very serious risks, in addition to cases in which
specific laws already require environmental permits and authorizations.
Obviously, it is very difficult to properly assess environmental risks.
Sometimes institutions show low sensitivity to them. In other cases, there is an overdimensioning of these risks. In the case of Minas Geris, the emergency plan which
was submitted clearly contained deficient information which lead to a greater impact
to the surrounding communities. Even admitting possible differences between
probabilistic prognostics and post-event reality, such significant discrepancies
denote at least serious deficiencies in environmental risk governance processes in
Brazil. Notwithstanding the precariousness of journalistic information presented
here, which can be challenged, it is undeniable that a reasonable precautionary
standard was not adopted in the plan for Minas Geris. Undoubtedly, what the plan
does illustrate is a low sensitivity of the environmental agencies to the necessary
management of serious risks, a trenchant recipe for regular reoccurrence of
environmental disasters.
In sum, in addition to the preventive and preparatory function of Emergency
Plans, disaster theory in general must find a place within the society in order to best
anticipate and mitigate future disasters. Such policy change requires a dynamic
reflection in advance of possible scenarios, including advance measures to be
adopted in each of the scenarios, delimitation of incumbencies, criteria for decisions
and composition of crisis teams. These plans should be periodically reviewed and in
constant development.
Although it is still early for conclusions of any nature, the Mariana disaster
seems to send a clear message that society must adopt a culture of circular
management of environmental risks and the need for institutionalized preparation
and presentation of Emergency Plans. The disaster cycle theory, and emergency
planning, presents a true strategic guide for society in the fallout of disaster, by
providing legal stability and security for those currently impacted and mitigating the
impact of future disasters. The clearest lesson from the Mariana Disaster is that the
historic way of approaching disaster is outdated and society must institute new
mechanisms to avoid times of chaos.

